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NOTES
REMOVAL OF SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 CLAIMS
AFTER SLUSA: WHAT CONGRESS CHANGED,
AND WHAT IT LEFT ALONE
JORDAN A. COSTAt
"I really didn't say everything I said "1
Yogi Berra
INTRODUCTION
The American corporate governance disasters that surfaced with
alarming frequency in the fall of 2001 resulted in far more than headline
news of executive malfeasance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.2 One of the
effects of the exposure of corporate wrongdoing was a mass of lawsuits by
investors. Enron alone gave rise to numerous claims by investors against
issuers under the federal securities laws.
3
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil suits arising
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act").
4
Consequently, using the Exchange Act's general antifraud provisions,
t J.D. candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002, Fairfield
University. The author is grateful to Professor Michael Perino for his guidance, expertise, and
encouragement.
YOGI BERRA & DAVE KAPLAN, WHAT TIME Is IT? YOU MEAN Now? 51 (2002).
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files
Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al (discussing Enron's historic
collapse and bankruptcy filing); Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid
Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al (calling the
WorldCom crisis "what appears to be one of the largest cases of false corporate bookkeeping
yet").
3 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 539
(S.D. Tex. 2003). See generally Oppel & Sorkin, supra note 2, at Al.
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) (providing for exclusive
federal jurisdiction over "violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder").
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section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, many investors sought relief in federal
court.5 The same is not true, however, for actions arising under the express
liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"),
which generally apply to an issuer's sale of securities to investors.6 The
concurrent jurisdiction provisions of the Securities Act have always given
investors the option of suing in either federal or state court. 7 While these
claims are predominantly filed in federal court, an increasing number of
plaintiffs attorneys, for a variety of strategic reasons,8 are choosing to file
in state rather then federal court. Not surprisingly, defendants often
remove such actions to federal court. 9
Prior to 1998, the Securities Act provided for nonremovable
concurrent jurisdiction giving investors the final say over where to litigate
their claims. 10 In 1998 Congress addressed widespread abuses of the state
court system by class action securities plaintiffs by passing the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA").11 Not only did SLUSA
preempt many state law securities class actions, it made significant
modifications to the removal provision of the Securities Act. SLUSA
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2003); see, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing 10(b) and lOb-5 actions "brought on behalf of purchasers of Enron
Corporation's publicly traded equity and debt securities" in federal court).
Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000); see LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS § I-H-2 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the Securities Act is concerned
with the "initial distribution of securities... to the public").
7 See infra note 34.
8 Pragmatic plaintiffs may be choosing to litigate in state court in order to litigate in front of
state judges. Federal judges adjudicate far more federal securities fraud cases, and as a result,
have arguably become jaded towards plaintiffs. Professors Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C.
Pritchard conducted an empirical study of 167 securities litigations in federal court, and
concluded that as a general proposition, familiarity with class action securities fraud litigation
"breeds skepticism on the bench." See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,
54 STAN. L. REv. 627, 635-36, 684-85 (2002). Judges in districts with a high volume of
securities fraud cases "tend to issue pro-defendant rulings on motions to dismiss." Id. at 635.
Judges in districts with higher volumes of securities fraud cases who themselves adjudicated
multiple claims are "even more strongly inclined to issue pro-defendant rulings on motions to
dismiss." Id. (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No.
03cv0714 BTM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15832, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003); Alkow v.
TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2243-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003);
Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., Inc., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *4
(N.D. I11. Apr. 15, 2003); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (C.D. Cal.
2003); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1994).
11 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SLUSA].
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provided an exception to the general rule that Securities Act claims are
nonremovable. 
12
The extent of this exception presented a novel issue for federal courts
deciding whether to adjudicate removed claims. Specifically, district
courts are not in agreement as to whether SLUSA modified the Securities
Act to allow for removal of a class action based only on the express
liability provisions of the Act itself.13 While at least three courts have
construed the exception narrowly and thus prohibited removal of class
actions asserting only Securities Act claims, 14 at least two others have
construed the exception broadly and allowed removal of such actions.15
This confusion poses a significant problem for both investors and
issuers. A district court's order remanding a case to the state court in
which it was originally brought may not be appealed, and, therefore, no
appellate court has addressed the divergence in authority. 16 Litigants are
thus left with an uncertain judicial landscape, as the issue of what the
removal provision in fact says remains largely unsettled.
That the unsettled point exists at all is somewhat surprising, given the
static nature of the provision from the passage of the Securities Act in
1933 until its modification by SLUSA in 1998. Congress had nearly fifty-
five years to consider modifying the Act to allow for removal of claims.' 7
When they did so under SLUSA, one would assume it would have been
with carefully crafted language to allow removal of an expressly delineated
group of claims. However, this was not the case. The language of the
exception is imprecise at best, causing litigants and the judiciary alike to
struggle with its application.
Commentators have often accused Congress of inattention to the
jurisdictional provisions of the securities laws.' 8 Perhaps the discrepancy
12 See SLUSA, § 101, 112 Stat. at 3230 (amending section 22(a) of the Securities Act).
13 Compare In re Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (holding corporation was not
entitled to removal under SLUSA because shareholders' claims were brought under federal
securities law), with Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (permitting such removal under SLUSA).
14 See Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15832, at
*54; Nauheim, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *17; Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
'5 See Alkow v. TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2243-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *6
(N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003); Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) (aggrieved defendant lacks standing to challenge a
district court decision adverse to their decision to remove); see also infra note 77 and
accompanying text.
17 See Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 115 U.S.C. § 77v (enacted in 1933); SLUSA, §§ 101,
22(a), 112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (amending Securities Act of 1933 in 1998).
IS See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal
Courts for Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709
(1982) (criticizing the lack of consistency among the jurisdictional provisions of the federal
securities statutes and proposing that the variations may be "the result of unfortunate legislative
2004] 1195
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exists here as a matter of happenstance-simply because Congress failed
to carefully consider the issue. However, there is evidence to the contrary
in the legislative history of SLUSA. Members of both houses did consider
the issue of removal of Securities Act claims. 9 Furthermore, at least one
member of Congress expressly supported a defendant's ability to remove
201all such actions.
If the discrepancy does not exist as a matter of legislative inattention,
perhaps it is the result of sloppy drafting. However, consideration of the
drafting alternatives that Congress could have chosen suggests otherwise.
Had Congress intended to allow for removal of all class actions arising
under the Securities Act, it could have done so via a simple and direct
modification of the statute. It did not do so.
2 1
Why did Congress not choose the relatively simple statutory language
that would have allowed defendants to remove all Securities Act claims?
This Note suggests that while some members of Congress intended to
allow removal of all Securities Act claims, Congress as a whole did not.
Furthermore, if SLUSA was explicitly drafted to allow for removal of all
Securities Act claims, federalism concerns may have prevented it from
passing a Democrat-controlled Senate in 1998.22 Thus, for purely political
reasons, those members of Congress whose statements in SLUSA's
legislative history indicate their support for removal of all claims may have
balked at effectuating these intentions clearly in the statute.23
This Note asserts, however, that the relevant inquiry here is not what
Congress intended, but what it actually changed when it modified the
removal provision of the Securities Act in SLUSA. Three issues are
addressed herein. What is the correct judicial interpretation of the removal
provision of the Securities Act as modified by SLUSA? Is the provision
clear enough to permit a district court to interpret it on its face? Finally, if
the provision may be so interpreted, did Congress actually effectuate its
intentions in modifying the provision?
It is well settled that where it is possible for a district court to interpret
a federal statute so as to give effect to every word that Congress put to
paper, it is inappropriate to look to legislative history for guidance in
interpreting a statute.24 While the removal provision of the Securities Act
apathY or inattention").
See discussion infra Part IV.B.20 See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
21 See discussion infta Part W.A.22 See discussion infra Part W.C.
23 See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992) (quoting
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
1196 [Vol.78:1193
REMOVAL OF SECURITIES A CT OF 1933 CLAIMS
could undoubtedly have been worded more clearly, this Note suggests that
it can be properly interpreted on its face to allow only for removal of
claims asserted along with preempted state law claims and therefore, it
should be interpreted as such. After all "imprecise" does not necessarily
mean "ambiguous. 25 Judicial resort to the legislative history of SLUSA to
interpret the provision of the Securities Act is unnecessary.
Finally, this Note suggests that although there is evidence in
SLUSA's legislative history that some members of Congress intended to
allow defendants the option to remove all Securities Act claims, this was
not the intent of Congress as a whole. The fact that Congress chose not to
enact a relatively simple modification to the removal provision of the Act
weighs heavily against the proposition that Congress failed to achieve its
objective in SLUSA.26
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background,
examining removal under the federal securities laws generally before
exploring the reasons for the passage of SLUSA and the modification of
the removal provision of the Securities Act. Part II discusses the reported
judicial decisions to date that have addressed the issue of whether SLUSA
allows removal of a Securities Act claim filed alone. Part III suggests that
the removal provision of the Securities Act can be interpreted without
resort to the legislative history of SLUSA, and must be so interpreted in
light of relevant statutory interpretation precedent. Part IV suggests simple
language that SLUSA could have used to allow for removal of all
Securities Act claims. It then examines the legislative history of SLUSA,
and concludes that while some members of Congress wanted to allow for
removal of all Securities Act claims, Congress as a whole did not.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Removal Jurisdiction Under the Federal Securities Laws
State courts of general jurisdiction and federal district courts
generally have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under
federal law.27 Where concurrent jurisdiction exists, a plaintiff may choose
U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
25 See discussion infra Conclusion.
26 See infra Part IV.
27 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 139, 145 (2001) ("[S]tate and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to hear most cases that fall within Article III."). Concurrent jurisdiction
does not exist, however, where Congress has expressly limited jurisdiction under a statute to the
federal courts, thereby preventing a plaintiff from bringing an action under it in state court. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000).
2004] 1197
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to bring a federal claim in state court.28  Removal jurisdiction allows a
defendant who is sued in state court on a federal claim to move the
litigation to the federal court in which the action could have been brought
initially.29  Defendants do not always have the option of removal.
Congress has reserved the right to circumscribe removal in all cases in
which they chose to do so in the modem removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1441.30
28 Commentators have proposed several justifications for concurrent jurisdiction, which
allows members of the state judiciary to decide questions of federal law at the discretion of the
plaintiff. Concurrent jurisdiction eliminates "the necessity for litigants to travel great distances to
federal forums" to litigate federal rights. Janet M. Bowermaster, Two (Federal) Wrongs Make a
(State) Right: State Class-Action Procedures as an Alternative to the Opt-In Class-Action
Provision of the ADEA, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 7, 49 (1991) (citing Charles Warren, Federal
Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545, 551 (1925)). The ability to litigate
federal claims in state court may also offer a plaintiff the ability to avoid a district court's
crowded docket and pursue expedient justice. See id. (noting the ability of concurrent jurisdiction
to "prevent congestion of the federal courts with the great volume of cases engendered by federal
statutes" (citing Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 516-17 (1928)).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1441. While the Constitution does not expressly provide for removal
jurisdiction, see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 38
(6th ed. 2002) (remarking that removal jurisdiction is not "mentioned in the Constitution");
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 401,
437 (1999) ("No provision in the Constitution authorizes federal courts to exercise removal
jurisdiction."), it has existed by federal statute since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80 (1789); Frank Pommersheim, "Our
Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal
Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 159 n.135 (2000)
(quoting ERWIN CHEMERiNSKy, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 322-23 (3d ed. 1999)) (noting that
while the constitution "defines the matters that federal courts may hear.., it is silent as to the
procedures that may be used to initiate federal court jurisdiction"); see also WRIGHT & KANE,
supra, at § 38 (tracing removal jurisdiction to the Judiciary Act of 1789); Tristin K. Green,
Comment, Complete Preemption - Removing the Mystery from Removal, 86 CAL. L. REv. 363,
364 (1998) (noting that removal was an "invention of Congress" which came into being when the
"Judiciary Act of 1789 established a provision permitting removal jurisdiction").
30 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 29, at § 38 (noting that § 1441 is the "present removal
statute"). Actions may be removed under § 1441(a) "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). Alternatively stated, removal is
authorized when Congress is otherwise silent on the matter. See Young, supra note 27, at 145
(remarking that removal jurisdiction exists "at Congress's sufferance").
Congress has, in some instances, expressly legislated to proscribe removal. See CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3721 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that "there
are a number of federal statutes expressly providing that particular actions are not removable,
even though they are within the original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts").
Other statutory restrictions include limiting removal to cases in which the federal courts
have original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra,
§ 3721 (noting that as a general rule, "an action is removable from a state court to a federal court
only if it might have been brought in the latter originally"), and limiting removal in diversity
cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. By discussing removal of Securities Act claims, this Note deals only
1198 [Vol.78:1193
REMOVAL OF SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 CLAIMS
Congress has expressly proscribed removal under § 1441 of several
private civil causes of action under the federal securities laws.3 In fact,
the federal securities laws generally fall into two32 removal jurisdiction
categories: those that provide for concurrent federal and state jurisdiction
with no right of removal to federal court, and those that provide for
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction subject to the right of removal to
federal court.33
The Securities Act of 1933 fell under the first category as originally
promulgated.34 While the Act provided for federal jurisdiction "concurrent
with removal of claims "arising under... [the] laws of the United States," which are "removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). The
availability of and procedure for removal in diversity cases will not be considered here. See
generally Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1992) (providing a thorough study of
the issue).
31 Beginning with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3,
Congress passed a total of six statutory schemes to regulate the securities industry. They include
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm, the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §79a-79z-z6, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§
77aaa-77bbbb, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64, and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21. Commentators have often.
discussed the lack of consistency among the jurisdictional provisions of these statutes. See
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 30, § 3584; see also, Hazen, supra note 18, at 709
(noting the lack of consistency among the jurisdictional provisions and proposing as a possible
reason for the divergence "legislative apathy or inattention"); Matthew J. Press, Note, Arbitration
of Claims Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Is Exclusive Jurisdiction Still Justified?,
77 B.U. L. REV. 629, 630 (1997) (noting the difference between the jurisdiction under the
Securities Exchange Act and the rest of the federal securities regulation statutes).
32 The Securities Exchange Act has always provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over
"all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C. 78aa. Exchange Act claims cannot be
brought in state court, are not subject to removal, and thus do not fall into either category. See
Press, supra note 31, at 63 1-32 (remarking that of the "six main federal statutes that regulate the
securities industry... only the 1934 Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction"); see also
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 30, § 3584 ("The Securities Exchange Act stands alone
[because the] jurisdiction of federal courts is exclusive of suits arising under [it].").
31 Public Utility Holding Act claims, see 15 U.S.C. § 79y, and Investment Advisers Act
claims, see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14, fall under the second jurisdictional category, giving state courts
of general jurisdiction and federal district courts jurisdiction concurrent with one another, subject
to the defendant's right of removal to federal court. While the Investment Company Act provides
for concurrent jurisdiction over claims as a general rule, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43, the statute further
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over suits to an investment advisor's "breach of [a]
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-35; see WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 30, § 3584. Thus, the Act falls within both categories.
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1994). The Trust Indenture Company Act incorporates by reference
the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act, and, consequently, an understanding of the
authority of state and federal courts to hear claims arising under the Act necessarily hinges upon
an interpretation of the referenced provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (2000) ("[J]urisdiction and
venue of suits and actions brought to enforce any liability or duty created by... this sub-chapter,
2004] 1199
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with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title," it further
provided that "no case.., brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States. 3 5
Accordingly, it was well settled that the provision modified the general
removal authority of § 1441(a), and thus prevented a defendant, sued in
state court under a Securities Act claim, from removing the action to
federal court.36
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Its Aftermath
In 1995, Congress overhauled class action securities litigation in
federal court by passing, over President Clinton's veto, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").37 The legislation was fueled
in part by a crescendo of protest in the early part of the decade from
"accountants, the high technology industry, and the securities industry,"
who asserted that widespread abuses in class action securities litigation had
led to "legalized extortion.,
38
Because securities class action litigation was easy to bring and
expensive to defend, defendants felt pressured into settling claims instead
or any rules or regulations or orders prescribed under the authority thereof, shall be as provided
in section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.") (emphasis added); see also WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 30, § 3584 (noting that the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act is
"incorporated by reference in the Trust Indenture Act").
3 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1994); see WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 22, § 3584 ("[T]he
Securities Act[] grants jurisdiction to the district courts concurrent with the courts of the states[]
and provides that no action brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction may be removed to
federal court."); Hazen, supra note 18, at 712 (discussing the Act's "concurrent, nonremovable
state jurisdiction"). Note that by incorporating this jurisdictional provision by reference, the Trust
Indenture Act also provided for concurrent, nonremovable state jurisdiction during this period.
See supra note 34.
16See, e.g., U. S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D. Del. 1972) (noting that
section 22(a) of the Securities Act "restricts the grant of general removal jurisdiction found in"
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)), rev'don other grounds, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976).
37 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]; see MICHAEL A. PERINO,
SECURITIES LITIGATION AFTER THE REFORM ACT 1011 (2004) (describing the passage of the
Act); Harvey L. Pitt et al., Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical Implications of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 845, 846 (1996)
(discussing the congressional override of President Clinton's veto).
38 PERINO, supra note 37, at 1013. Members of the Republican party addressed the
concerns of the high technology industry in particular in their 1994 Contract with America. See,
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND
THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 150 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Shellhas eds.
1994) (noting that "high technology.., and other growth companies are the hardest hit" by
abuses in securities class action litigation).
1200 [Vol.78:1193
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of undertaking the expense of litigating them.39 Then future Securities and
Exchange Commission chairman Harvey Pitt suggested that the issuer's
decision to settle was a matter of economics, and not of culpability:
[A]n adverse announcement by a public company which produced a
quick drop in the company's stock price [would be followed] [w]ithin
days-sometimes within hours-[by] shareholder class action
complaints ... alleging that earlier statements of optimism by the
company or its executives constituted securities fraud. Confronted with
costly litigation and potentially crippling liability, the vast majority of
defendants settled.4°
To combat the problem, the PSLRA significantly reformed the federal
securities laws to make private litigation more difficult to bring in federal
court. 41 The overarching goal of the legislation was to provide protection
"from abusive securities litigation" for "investors, issuers, and all who are
associated with" the American capital markets.42
In 1997, at the request of President Clinton, the SEC's Office of the
General Counsel studied securities class action litigation after the PSLRA
in an effort to measure the level of success the Act had achieved in
attaining its aforementioned goals. In doing so, it prepared a report which
39 See PERINO, supra note 37, at 1016; see, e.g., William Tucker, Shakedown?: Technology
Firms Have Volatile Earnings. Lawyers Have Figured Out How to Get Fat Off This Fact ofLife,
FORBES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 98. (reporting how one high technology CEO remarked that plaintiffs'
attorneys "know how expensive it is for us to take our case to court. We're supposed to give
them a few million dollars so they'll go away.").
40 Pitt, supra note 37, at 847. Professor Janet Cooper Alexander of Stanford Law School
studied a group of securities lawsuits relating to initial public offerings of securities in the high
technology industry, and concluded that:
i) Lawsuits were filed "against every company in the industry whose stock declined
significantly in the months following its initial stock offering";
ii) virtually every suit settled; and
iii) most cases settled for almost precisely 25 percent of the dama ge exposure, and
where they did not, the deviations could be "accounted for by non-merits-related
factors."
Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous
Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 959, 960 (1996) (citing and quoting Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study
of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1991)).
41 See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Law After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act-Unfinished Business, 50 SMU L. REV. 9, 10-12, 17, 19 (1996) (discussing the reforms in the
PSLRA which are broadly aimed at achieving this result). Professor Michael A. Perino has
summarized the PSLRA's reforms by organizing them into nine major categories as follows: (1)
Pre-Filing and Case Organization Requirements, PERINO, supra note 37, at 1023, (2) Pleading
and Proof Requirements, id at 1024-25, (3) Mandatory Discovery Stay, id at 1025, (4)
Proportionate Liability and Contribution, id. at 1026, (5) Damages, id., (6) Sanctions, id at
1026-27, (7) Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, id. at 1027, (8) Class Action
Settlement Procedures, id. at 1027-28, and (9) Miscellaneous Provisions, id at 1028.
42 H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995).
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addressed the impact of the PSLRA "on the effectiveness of the securities
laws and on investor protection," and examined "the extent and nature of
any litigation under the Act." 43 The report found that the PSLRA
produced both intended and unintended consequences.44
Among the intended consequences of the Act was an overall decrease
in volume of securities class action activity in federal court.45 Simply put,
issuers were sued less frequently in federal court immediately following
the PSLRA than in the months leading to its passage: 52% fewer federal
securities class actions were filed in federal court during the year following
the passage of the PSLRA than in the year preceding it.
4 6
Of those actions that were brought, there was an increased delay
between the release of adverse information about an issuer and the filing of
the action against them.47 It was evident from the actions filed after the
PSLRA that "greater research and investigation" began to go into the
typical federal securities class action complaint, a fact that points towards
43 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 1 (1997) at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/reform.txt [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
44 See infra notes 45-46, 49 and accompanying text. Commentators across various legal
disciplines have often described a "law of unintended consequences" of legislative activity.
Hindsight often reveals that prediction of all of the effects of even well studied and carefully
drafted legislation is impossible. See generally Rob Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism in
Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 81,
82-84 (2001) (noting the unintended consequences of federal telecommunications legislation);
David A. Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for the Perplexed, 26 AM.
J.L. & MED. 143, 148 (2000) (remarking that the "costs of... unintended consequences" must be
taken into account in determining the appropriateness of prospective legislative activity);
Symposium on Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law: The Proper Scope of lP Rights in
the Post-Genomics Era, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 233, 250 (2002) ("All legislation has
unintended consequences .... ) (comments of Rebecca Eisenberg).
45 See PERINO, supra note 37, at 1017.
46 SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at 2-21. The report does qualify this statistic somewhat. It
notes that "the first three months of the year following passage of the Act are unrepresentative
[because] only 15% of the cases were filed in this quarter." Id. at 1. It notes further that "1996
witnessed a bull market." Id. at 22. Finally, the report cautions against judging the effectiveness
of the PSLRA on purely statistical grounds alone. Id. However, shortcomings of the statistic
notwithstanding, the report concludes that "[t]he 'race to the courthouse' has slowed somewhat,"
following the passage of the PSLRA. Id. at 23.
By 1998, the drop in federal securities class action filings that the SEC had identified had
largely disappeared. See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, MICHAEL A. PERINO ET AL., SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION IN FIRST QUARTER 1998, at 1 (1998) (noting that "[t]he volume of
securities class action activity in federal court has grown substantially since the earliest days of
the Reform Act").
47 See SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at 24. The report attributed the slowing of the "race to
the courthouse" to the heightened pleading standards and lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA.
See id.
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the conclusion that while meritorious claims were still developed and
brought, frivolous claims were not.48
The report found, however, that the most "significant development in
securities litigation post-Reform Act" may in fact have been an unintended
consequence of the legislation-a dramatic shift in class action filings
from federal court to state court during the year following the enactment of
the PSLRA.49 Professors Michael A. Perino and Joseph A. Grundfest
similarly asserted in a 1997 paper that approximately 26% of securities
class action litigation moved from federal to state court during the year
after the passage of the PSLRA.50
The shift of securities class action litigation from federal to state
courts was attributed to a "'substitution effect' whereby plaintiffs resort to
state court to avoid the new, more stringent requirements" imposed by the
federal judiciary on litigants per the PSLRA.51 Plaintiffs had an incentive
to file actions in state court to avoid the PSLRA's heightened pleading
standard, discovery stay, and safe harbor for forward-looking
information.52
The shift threatened to undermine the intentions of the PSLRA by
providing litigants with another forum in which to bring the very type of
non-meritorious and aggressive actions that the Act sought to eliminate.53
48 See id. at 22 (finding that less then 12% of the complaints filed post-PSLRA were "based
solely on forecasts that have not proved true" and furthermore that the complaints in general did
"not have the type of glaring errors which would suggest that they were the product of a hurried
word processing 'cut and paste').
49 Id. at 70-71; see PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,011 ("One of the most significant of [the]
unintended consequences [of the PSLRA] involved plaintiffs attorneys' strategic attempt to
avoid the Reform Act altogether by filing their actions in state rather then federal court.").
50 JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM, THE
FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE: A STATISTICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTION
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF
1995, at ii (rel. 97.1) (1997).
51 See GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 50, at 49. The notion that restrictive interpretation
of the federal securities laws by the federal judiciary could potentially lead to a movement of
litigation to state courts was not foreign to scholarly literature prior to the PSLRA. See PERINO,
supra note 37, at 11,015 n.20.
52 See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 292-93 (1998). Professor Richard W. Painter
summarized the reasons which were often offered to substantiate the movement of plaintiffs to
state court to avoid the PSLRA's requirements:
First, statistical data purportedly show that plaintiffs filed claims in state court that the
1995 Reform Act made difficult to litigate in federal court.... Second, proponents of
preemption argue that other groups of plaintiffs filed suits simultaneously in state and
federal court.., in order to evade the 1995 Reform Act's discovery stay.
Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud
Causes ofAction, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42 (1998).
53 See Painter, supra note 52, at 42.
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Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of the General
Counsel reported that of the securities class action litigations that it
studied, which were commenced in state court during the year after the
PSLRA's passage, 54 15% were based "solely on failed forecasts"--the
very type of litigation based on highly speculative assumptions of issuer
wrongdoing that the PSLRA was intended to address." Plaintiffs'
attorneys had strategically selected state forums when they had low
expectations that their actions would "survive a motion to dismiss under"
the federal securities law as modified by the PSLRA 6
C. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
Congress was not blind to the fact that its intentions in enacting the
PSLRA were regularly being subverted by the creativity of plaintiff's
counsel. On July 24, 1997, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities held an
oversight hearing on the PSLRA, and heard testimony from ten witnesses
on the matter.57 Shortly thereafter, senators Phil Gramm, Christopher
Dodd, Peter V. Domenici, and eleven others introduced the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997.58 The bill preempted state-law-
based securities fraud class actions for certain nationally-traded
securities.59
Supporters of the Uniform Standards Act argued that preemption was
necessary for two major reasons.60  First, statistical data indicated that
54 The report does note that due to difficulty in obtaining data about the number of
securities-related cases filed in state court, its findings on the matter were not to be treated as
exhaustive. See SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at 72 n.253.
55 See id, at 75 (reporting that as compared to 12% of complaints filed at the state level,
"15% of the state court complaints we reviewed [were] based solely on failed forecasts").
Another commentator, studying a different sample of state court filings, suggested that the
differential between false forecast complaints filed in state rather then federal court was
significantly higher. See Perino, supra note 52, at 313 ("[Tlhere are approximately twice as many
state court complaints based solely on false forecasts as there were in the federal sample .... ").
56 See Perino, supra note 52, at 307 (discussing how "weaker" cases are filed in state courts
in order to circumvent the PSLRA's strong inference of fraud pleading standard).
" S. REP. No. 105-182, at 1-2 (1998). The witnesses represented all perspectives on the
issue, from those in the academic and regulatory community who had identified the post-PSLRA
shift in litigation to state court, to those in the high technology industry who had allegedly been
adversely affected by the post-PSLRA activity, to prominent representatives from the securities
class action plaintiffs' bar. See id. at 1-5.
58 See Painter, supra note 52, at 49. Representatives Rick White and Anna Eshoo
introduced a near identical bill in the House of Representatives. See id. at 47.
'9 A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, and the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 436-37 (2000); see also
PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,021 (noting that "SLUSA structures preemption by invoking the
language of the implied and express private rights of action under the federal securities laws").
See Painter, supra note 52, at 41.
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plaintiffs filed weaker claims in state court that the PSLRA made difficult
to litigate in federal court, because of, for example, the PSLRA's discovery
61stay. Preemption was thus necessary "to ensure the effectiveness of the
Reform Act.",62  Second, the subversion of the PSLRA would be
exacerbated by a projected race-to-the-bottom, in which "one or more
states ... enact laws decidedly more favorable to plaintiffs than federal
law.
63
SLUSA passed by unanimous consent in the Senate and by a vote of
319-82 in the House, and was signed into law by President Clinton on
November 3, 1998. 64 It represented a direct attempt by Congress to
"limit[] the post-PSLRA shift of cases from federal to state court., 65
Toward that end, SLUSA "deprived state courts of the power to adjudicate
certain securities fraud class actions. 66 Although the language used is not
identical, SLUSA essentially preempted all state law class actions which
fell within the scope of Rule 1Ob-5, 67 a general federal anti-fraud
prohibition which was promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act.68
Mechanically, preemption is accomplished by permitting the
defendant to remove preempted claims, which the federal court must then
dismiss. 69 Thus, instead of bringing a motion to dismiss in state court, a
defendant must remove the action so that it can be dismissed in federal
court.7v Commentators have noted that Congress chose removal to
61 See id.
62 PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,018.
63 See Painter, supra note 52, at 41; see also PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,019 (noting the
argument for preemption, which proposes, that because "the securities most effected by class
action litigation were securities that traded on national markets .... [ut [makes] little sense to
have these securities subject to possibly inconsistent rules in different jurisdictions").
64 Painter, supra note 52, at 58-59; see also PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,020.
65 PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,020-21.66 Pritchard, supra note 59 at 483. SLUSA also gave federal courts discretion to stay state
court proceedings. PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,040. These provisions of SLUSA, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-l(b)(4), 78u-4(b)(3)(D) (2000), which "empower[] courts to prevent parties from
circumventing the [PSLRA's] discovery stay through state court actions," PERINO, supra note
37, at 11,040, are beyond the scope of this note.
67 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004).
68 See Pritchard, supra note 59, at 483 n.242 ("[SLUSA] has essentially the same broad
reach as the general anti-fraud prohibition found in the SEC's Rule lOb-5 ... .").
69 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (providing that no preempted action "may be
maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party"); see also PERINO, supra note 37,
at 11,022 ("The federal court must dismiss the removed action if it determines that the SLUSA
preempts it.").
70 See Pritchard, supra note 59, at 490 (noting that "[o]rdinarily, one would expect the law
to require the defendant to bring its motion to dismiss or demurrer in state court").
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accomplish preemption so that the federal judiciary would be the
interpreter of the scope of SLUSA's preemption.71
SLUSA's use of the removal device to accomplish preemption of
state claims created a novel issue in terms of removal of federal claims.
SLUSA modified the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934
to facilitate removal of preempted claims.72 Jurisdiction over Exchange
Act claims has always been exclusively federal, and thus SLUSA did not
result in confusion over removal of Exchange Act claims themselves.73
Prior to 1998, however, the Securities Act provided for nonremovable
concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under its express liability
provisions.74 SLUSA modified the removal provision of Securities Act by
inserting the language "[e]xcept as provided in section 16(c)" before "no
case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction shall be removed ... This modification, to
allow preempted state law claims to be removed and dismissed at the
federal level, created some situations in which federal claims arising under
the Securities Act are removable.
There is considerable judicial confusion, however, about when those
situations, in which a defendant may remove a Securities Act claim filed in
state court, exist.76  What did Congress change, and what did it leave
alone? May a defendant remove an action brought only under the express
liability provisions of the Securities Act? As a defendant generally lacks
any recourse to appeal a district court decision to remand a case to the
State court from which it was removed, there is consequently no appellate
authority to clarify this confusion. 77 Most district courts faced with this
71 Id. ("The removal provision... serves [an] important federal interest[]: it allows federal
courts to interpret the scope of preemption, thus enhancing uniformity."); see also PERINO, supra
note 37, at 11,022 (noting that Congress intended to have "federal courts, rather than state
courts,... interpret the scope of preemption under the statute").
72 See SLUSA, §§ 101, 22(a), 28, 112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (1998) (amending section 22(a) of
the Securities Act and section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act).
73 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Section 27 states:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id. (emphasis added).
74 See discussion supra Part I.A.
75 SLUSA § 101(a)(3) (amending section 22(a) of the Securities Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77v
(section 22(a) as amended).
76 See discussion infra Part II.A.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides a "[p]rocedure after removal generally," proscribes
review of an order to remand "a case to the State court from which it was removed on appeal or
otherwise," 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and thus, an aggrieved defendant lacks standing to challenge a
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issue today are thus faced with an issue of first impression, with scarce
authority to guide their decision.
II. INTERPRETING THE REMOVAL PROVISION OF THE SECURITIES ACT
AFTER SLUSA
A. Divided Judicial Decisions
Five reported district court decisions to date address the issue of
whether SLUSA permits removal of a class action that implicates only the
express liability provisions of the Securities Act. The decisions are
divided: three courts have remanded the removed Securities Act cases,78
while two courts have kept the cases in federal court.79
1. SLUSA Proscribes Removal of a Class Action Alleging Only Securities
Act Claims
In In re Waste Management, Inc. Securities Litigation," the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in a case of first
impression, 81 held that it was improper to remove a case alleging only
violations of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 193382
from state court,83 and therefore remanded the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).84
district court decision adverse to their decision to remove. While the statute provides an
exception for civil rights cases, id. (providing that an order remanding a case removed pursuant
to § 1443 "shall be reviewable"), such is clearly inapplicable to Securities Act cases.
Additionally, it is well settled that a defendant may not skirt an adverse decision to remand via a
mandamus suit. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
107App. 113 (2)(a) (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the "general principle that mandamus will not lie
to compel retention of a case"). Furthermore, the narrow exception to this rule carved out by the
Supreme Court in Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 353 (1976), which
allows mandamus in those rare cases in which a district court remands "for reasons not
authorized by statute," 16 MOORE ET AL., supra § 107App.I 13(2)(a), has yet to be invoked post-
SLUSA to challenge remand of a Securities Act claim.
78 See Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03cv0714
BTM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15832, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003); Nauheim v.
Interpublic Group of Cos., Inc., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *17 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 15, 2003); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
79 Alkow v TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *7 (N.D.
Tex. May 8, 2003); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
80 194 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
81 Id. at 591.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(a)(2), 77(o); see Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591. The
plaintiffs sued "solely under the Securities Act of 1933 on behalf of themselves and all other
similarly situated .... Id. (emphasis added).
83 Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
84 Id. at 596; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it appears that
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The court reviewed the history of the SLUSA, and noted that it "made
federal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class actions meeting
its definitions and ensured they would be governed exclusively by federal
law" 85 by providing for "mandatory removal and dismissal' 8 6 of "securities
fraud claims that fall within its ambit.'' 87 The court noted the well-settled
rule that a defendant whose removal of a claim under SLUSA was
challenged by a motion to remand for improper removal must satisfy a
five-part test to defeat the motion by showing:
(1) [that] the action is a "covered class action" under SLUSA;
(2) that the causes of action on their face are based on state statutory or
common law;
(3) that it involves a covered security under SLUSA;
(4) that it alleges Defendants have misrepresented or omitted material
facts;
(5) that the alleged misrepresentation or omission was made "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of the covered security.
s8
Plaintiffs noted that their action was based solely on Securities Act claims.
Because SLUSA allows removal of "covered class actions," which are
defined only to include "certain class actions that assert state statutory or
common law claims," the action was nonremovable and must therefore be
remanded.89
Defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims in fact satisfied steps
one, three, four and five of the test,90 and challenged the validity of the
"state statutory or common law" requirement of step two. Section 22(a) of
the Securities Act does not allow for removal of "[any] case arising under
this subchapter and brought in any State court," 91 except as provided in
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.").
8 Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
86 Id. at 593.
87 Id. at 594.
88 Id. The court relied on Korsinsky v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6085
(SKW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 259, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2002), and Hardy v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), for this test. The
court here sets forth the test in five steps; most other jurisdictions articulate it in four steps. See,
e.g., Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11 th Cir. 2002);
Shaev v. Claflin, No. C 01-0009 MJJ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6677, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 16,
20012; Shaw v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 594-96 (emphasis added).
90 Id at 595 (noting defendants' arguments that the case was a "covered class action"
involving a "covered security" and that it alleged an "untrue statement of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security").
"' 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
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section 16(c). 92 The defendants argued that construing the Securities Act
to allow removal only of state law claims would fail to give effect to the
word "except" in the statute, because a state law claim can never arise
under the Securities Act itself.
93
The court expressed its disagreement with the defendants' argument,
94
but failed to clarify its position by articulating a different reading of the
Securities Act after SLUSA. Furthermore, the court did not directly
express its approval of the plaintiffs' reading of the statute.95 Instead, the
court based its holding that removal was improper on several other factors.
It emphasized the well-settled interpretation of the removal provision of
the Securities Act prior to SLUSA, and noted the lack of any "express
statement by Congress that it was modifying the traditional rule,"
proposing that "Congress could easily have made a statement in SLUSA
expressly modifying this provision had it so intended.
96
In Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.,97 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois similarly held that
the "plain language of the Securities Act as amended by SLUSA,"
98
permits "removal of only those covered class action complaints that are
92 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
9' Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
94 Id. at 596 ("[T]he Court finds Defendants' arguments unpersuasive and disagrees with
Defendants' broad assertion[s] .... ").
95 In fact, the court notes that the plaintiffs' reliance on a Delaware District Court case in
support of their contention was misplaced. Id. at 594 (citing and interpreting Derdiger v.
Tallman, 75 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D. Del. 1999)).
96 Id., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 596. The court also noted that as of its decision, "no court has held
that claims under the 1933 Act, standing alone, are removable under SLUSA," id. at 596, an
entirely circular reason for supporting its holding given its earlier recognition of the issue being
one of "first impression." Id. at 591. Supporting what is admitted to be the first decision on point
with the argument that no authority had previously held otherwise is, at best, redundant and
wholly unpersuasive.
The court also briefly discusses two post SLUSA decisions which, in interpreting the
removal provisions of other federal statutory schemes that provide for concurrent jurisdiction,
have examined the analogous provision in the Securities Act and determined that it prevents
removal of Securities Act claims filed in state court. Id. at 596 (citing PaineWebber, Inc., v.
Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 208-09 (6th Cir. 2001); Roseman v. Best Buy Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1332,
1334 (S.D. Ga. 2001)). This reasoning is certainly more persuasive, especially given that one of
the cited courts is a Court of Appeals. However, the author disagrees with the Waste
Management court's reliance on the cases, because the cited decisions only briefly discuss
removal of Securities Act claims and do not in either case support the positions asserted with
regard to removal of Securities Act claims. Furthermore, the court, in so relying, failed to discuss
in detail its response to the persuasiveness of either the plaintiffs' or defendants' aforementioned
statutory arguments.
" No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *1 (N.D. I11. Apr. 15, 2003).
98 Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted).
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based on State statutory or common law." 99 They briefly discussed the
aforementioned five step test to defeat a motion to remand °° in support of
its conclusion that the statute only allows removal of state law claims.
While the Waste Management court may have dodged the issue
entirely, the Nauheim court indulged a meaningless legal fiction to dispose
of the defendants' argument that interpreting the Securities Act to never
permit removal of Securities Act claims renders meaningless the use of the
word "except" in section 22(a). Concededly, the defendants' argument
was entirely too broad in asserting that the only way to "give meaning" to
the language of section 22(a) is to permit removal of all "covered class
actions alleging fraud or manipulation involving the sale or purchase of
covered securities, regardless of whether they arise under state or federal
law." 10  However, the court's assertion that the challenged language is
"made meaningful" by section 16(c)'s "preemption of an expressly
delineated category of state law class actions"102 is, in this author's
opinion, simply wrong. It is impossible to "make meaningful" every word
in section 22(a) without giving meaning to the word "except." Interpreting
the statute to only permit removal of state law claims does not give any
meaning to the word.
As the plaintiffs argued in Waste Management, a state law claim can
never "arise under" the Securities Act. 103 Therefore, if only state law
claims are removable, a claim "aris[ing] under this subchapter" is never
removable, thus rendering the word "except" meaningless. Put
alternatively, section 22(a) provides a general rule that a case arising under
the Securities Act is not removable, but indicates that there is one
exception.10 4 The Nauheim court held that, contrary to what the statute
says on its face, there is in fact no exception, and entirely failed to justify
this conclusion. 105
99 Id. at * 11 (emphasis added). The court in turn relies on the Waste Management court's
discussion of the "'plain language of SLUSA' demonstrating "'Congress' intent to preempt a
specifically defined category of state-law class actions"' Id. at * 11 (quoting Waste Mgmt., 194 F.
Supp. 2d at 593) (internal citation omitted). This language notwithstanding, this author again
submits that the Waste Management court's discussion of the "plain language" of the Securities
Act as modified by SLUSA was inadequate.
1OO Id. at *11-12; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Nauheim, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *14 (emphasis added).
102 Id. at *15.
103 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
'o' See Nauheim, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *17. The author disagrees with the court's
conclusion regarding the "clear and unambiguous language of the statute." See id. Furthermore,
the court contradicted its own assertion that the statute is clear on its face. While in one instance
it reasoned, "[w]here, as here, the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is
complete," id. at * 12 (emphasis added) (citing Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
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Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine
Corp.106 is the most recent reported decision on the issue. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of California announced its
decision to follow Waste Management and Nauheim'0 7 before similarly
concluding that "the plain language" of section 16(c) of the Securities Act
"limits removal to class actions that are based upon state claims."
1
,
0 8
The court expressly recognized the aforementioned inconsistency
between the use of the words "except" and "arising under" in the statute
and a holding that only state law claims are removable. 0 9 However, it
concluded that the "statute is clear" and that it is inappropriate to "modify
it to effect Congress's likely intent." 10 Congressional intent aside, the
court directly contradicted itself by calling the statute "clear" and by
simultaneously recognizing the "inconsistency" in its language."' The
court's holding is, therefore, little more than mere acceptance of non-
binding precedent. The Southern District of California in supporting their
conclusion on the face of the Securities Act itself, ignored the opportunity
to succeed where the preceding courts, which have adopted its position,
have failed.
2. SLUSA Permits Removal of a Class Action Alleging Only Securities
Act Claims
Brody v. Homestore, Inc. 112 was the first reported decision to hold that
SLUSA permits removal of a case in which the plaintiffs allege only
Securities Act claims."i 3 In Brody, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California supported its conclusion in large part by
relying on the legislative history of SLUSA. 1
4
254 (1992)), by later engaging in a discussion of the legislative history of SLUSA in support of
its holding, see Nauheim, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at * 15-16, it wholly undermined this
conclusion.
106 No. 03cv0714 BTM(JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15832, at * 1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26,
2003).
107 See id. at *5 (noting that the court "agrees with the reasoning of In re Waste
Management [and] Nauheim").
108 Id.
109 See id. at *6.
110 Id.
... See id.
112 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
113 Id. at 1123 (holding that "SLUSA authorizes removal of class actions asserting
violations of the 1933 Act").
14 See id. at 1123-24 The author submits that this reliance on the legislative history of
SLUSA in interpreting the provision as written was wholly inappropriate. See discussion infra
Part III.B.
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The court noted the findings in the legislation itself regarding the
"number of securities class action lawsuits [that] have shifted from Federal
to State courts."" 5 It then looked beyond the statute to further support the
proposition that SLUSA modified the Securities Act to allow a defendant
to remove Securities Act claims filed alone.'
1 6
Finally, the court discussed what it considered to be the "most
persuasive argument" in support of its holding.1 7 It reasoned that because
section 22(a) of the Securities Act did not permit removal of claims filed in
state court prior to SLUSA," 8 and SLUSA modified this section so as to
exempt "covered class actions" from this prohibition," 9 SLUSA therefore
must have modified the provision to allow removal of Securities Act
claims.' 20 This reasoning ignores the fact that interpreting section 22(a) as
permitting removal of only state law claims is a significant departure from
the pre-SLUSA meaning of the provision.' 2' Thus, the interpretation put
forth by the plaintiff, "that SLUSA meant to authorize removal only of
securities litigation brought pursuant to state law,"' 2 2 would hardly render
the "amendment to [section 22] meaningless," as the court suggests. 23
In Alkow v. TXU Corp.,124 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that removal of a class action asserting
only Securities Act claims was proper under SLUSA. 25 The court noted
that generally, the plaintiff's choice of state or federal court under the
Securities Act is to be undisturbed. 26 It observed that the one exception to
this rule is section 16(c), and focused its attention on interpreting the
exception. 1
27
"5 See Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (quoting SLUSA, § 2, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998)).
116 See id. (citing 144 CONG. REc. H11019-01, HI 1020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Bliley)).
117 Id.
118 See id. (noting that "[p]rior to SLUSA, [section 22(a)] prohibited removal of claims
brought under the 1933 Act").
119 See id.
120 See id. (reasoning that to interpret the provision otherwise "would render the amendment
to [section 22(a)] meaningless").
121 See discussion supra Part I.A.
122 Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
123 See id.
124 No. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
125 See id. at *6.
126 See id. at *3 (remarking that if a plaintiff choose to bring a Securities Act claim in state
court, "a defendant generally has no right to remove the case to federal court" (citing 15 U.S.C. §
77v(a) (2000))).
See id. (noting that the "one exception to the general rule is [section 16(c)]").
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The Alkow court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the exception
applied only to state law claims. 128 It reasoned that if section 16(c) applied
only to state claims, "no claims arising under the 1933 Act would be
removable., 129 The word "except" in section 22(a) would be meaningless,
because no state law claim could ever arise under the Securities Act.'3"
The court reasoned that by reading the statute to allow removal of
Securities Act claims, it was able to "harmonize[]" sections 16(c) and
22(a) of the Securities Act. Finally, the court looked to the legislative
findings in the statute itself to support its conclusion that allowing removal
furthered the intent of Congress to "counteract the shift in [securities]
cases to state courts" prior to SLUSA.1
31
B. Interpreting the Removal Provision of the Securities Act on its Face
1. Statutory Interpretation Precedent
It is well settled that courts interpreting a statute should "give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute. 1 32 Put alternatively,
"[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous... 'judicial inquiry is
complete '"1 33  Furthermore, because "courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there,"' 134 resort to the legislative history of a statute that can be
interpreted on its face is inappropriate. The "sole function of the courts"
presented with such an unambiguous legislative enactment "is to enforce it
according to its terms.'
135
Thus, a district court determining whether to adjudicate or remand a
case in which the plaintiffs allege only violations of the Securities Act of
1933 should reach an initial conclusion as to whether the statute can be
read "to give effect ... to every clause and word" that Congress put to
128 Id. (remarking that "[a] careful reading of the statute... shows the [plaintiffs']
arguments are unpersuasive").
129 Id. at *4.
130 See id. at *3-4 (noting that accepting the plaintiffs' argument "would require the court
to ignore the language Congress chose," which it cannot do).
131 Id. at *46.
132 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 100 (1992) (quoting United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S.
147, 152 (1883))).
131 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (citing Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
134 Id. at 253-54 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42
(1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 53, 68 (1810)).
135 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
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paper.136 If such a reading is possible, the court should end their inquiry
there, 137 presume that Congress effectuated its intentions in the statute, and
apply the statute on its face without resort to its legislative history.
2. Giving Effect to Every Word of the Statute
It is submitted that the removal provision of the Securities Act, as
modified by SLUSA, can be interpreted on its face, and therefore should
be so interpreted, without regard to the statute's legislative history. A
Securities Act claim is removable only when it is asserted along with a
state law claim that SLUSA preempts. 138  Only in these very limited
circumstances does SLUSA change 39 the well-settled rule 140 that a
Securities Act claim is not removable.
The obvious starting point in concluding that the statute can be
properly interpreted on its face is section 22(a) itself.'41 It provides: "[N]o
case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States."'' 42 Thus, as a general rule, claims "arising under" the Securities
Act are not removable.
The sentence providing this general rule is, however, qualified by the
language which precedes it. Consequently, the general rule applies
"[e]xcept as provided in section [1 6(c)].' 43 The court is thus instructed by
section 22(a) to turn to section 16(c) to learn when claims "arising under"
the Securities Act are removable.
There is no possible reading of the statute that gives effect to every
word Congress put to paper and, at the same time, fails to allow removal of
any claims "arising under" the Securities Act. Such a reading would
render the word "except" meaningless, as there would be no exception to
the aforementioned general rule.' 44  Conversely, there is no possible
136 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 100 (quoting Menasehe, 348 U.S. at 538-539 (quoting Montclair,
107 U.S. at 152)).
137 See Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 503 U.S. at 254 (citing Rubin 449 U.S. at 430).
138 See PERINO, supra note 37, at 11,029.
139 See discussion supra Part I.C.
140 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
141 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).
142 Id.
143 Id. (emphasis added).
144 For precisely this reason, the author disagrees with the reported decisions which have
held that no claims "arising under" the Securities Act are removable after SLUSA. See Hawaii
Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03cv0714 BTM(JFS), 2003
U.S. Dist LEXIS 15832, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2003) ("The plain language of [the Securities
Act] limits removal to class actions that are based upon state claims."); Nauheim v. Interpublic
Group of Cos., Inc., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6266, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15,
2003) (holding that "[u]nder the clear and unambiguous language of [the Securities Act] as
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reading of the statute that gives effect to every word Congress put to paper
and, at the same time, allows removal of all claims "arising under" the
Securities Act. 145  If all claims "arising under" the Securities Act were
removable, the statute's qualifying language would fail to be an exception
at all, and, again, the word "except" would be rendered meaningless.
Therefore, as directed by section 22(a), we turn next to section 16(c) 146 to
determine the subset of Securities Act claims filed in state court that are
removable.
To be removable under section 16(c), the claims must meet the
relatively complex definition of a "covered class action" 147 and must
amended by SLUSA," the plaintiffs' complaint, which was "based entirely on" the Securities
Act, "cannot be removed from state court"); In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d
590, 596 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (construing the "plain, literal meaning of the non-removability clause
of the 1933 Act" as preventing removal of Securities Act claims).
145 The author disagrees with the reported decisions which can be read to permit removal of
all, and not a statutorily prescribed subset of claims "arising under" the Securities Act. Such
decisions are entirely inconsistent with a reading of the statute on its face which gives effect to
every word Congress put to paper. See Alkow v TXU Corp., No. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7900, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d
1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
146 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c). Section 16(c) provides: "Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be
subject to subsection (b) of this section." Id.
147 Id. "For the purposes of' section 16 in subsection 16(f)(2)(A), a "covered class action"
includes:
(i) any single lawsuit in which-
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or prospective class
members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of
the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an
alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions affecting only
individual persons or members; or
(II) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis
on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated, and
questions of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons or
members; or
(ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common
questions of law or fact, in which-
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and
(II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action
for any purpose.
Id. § 77p(f(2)(A).
Excluded from the above definition in subsection 16(f)(2)(B) are derivative actions: "[T]he
term 'covered class action' does not include an exclusively derivative action brought by one or
more shareholders on behalf of a corporation." Id. § 77(f)(2)(B)
The statute further specifies in subsection 16(f)(2)(C) how various business organizations
are to be treated numerically for purposes of the definition: "For purposes of this paragraph, a
corporation, investment company, pension plan, partnership, or other entity, shall be treated as
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involve a "covered security."' 148 Thus, for example, an individual action
brought under the Securities Act 149 that does not meet the statutory
definition of a "covered class action,"' 5 ° does not implicate section 16(c),
and is, therefore, not removable.
1 51
Of the subset of cases that satisfy the statutory definitions, only those
cases which further implicate section 16(b) are removable.' 52 The statute
refers to subsection 16(b) twice: first, to limit those "covered class
actions" which may be removed to those "involving... covered
securit[ies], as set forth in subsection (b),"'5 3 and again to indicate that
once removed, the action itself is "subject to subsection (b).' 54  This
reading is necessary to give effect to both mentions of subsection 16(b). If
the statute was drafted to allow removal of any Securities Act claim which
was a "covered class action" involving "covered security," it would not
contain the first reference to section 1 6(b)-only the second, which gives
the district court instructions on how to proceed with the action on
removal. This is not, of course, what Congress did. By referring to the
section twice, the first instance qualifies which covered class actions
involving covered securities may be removed, and the second indicates
that the removed case "shall be subject to subsection (b)."'' 55 The second
reference does not indicate again which claims are removable, but instead
indicates what should be done with them on removal. To read the statute
otherwise so as to allow removal of all Securities Act claims which meet
the statutory definitions would fail to give effect to the first mention of
section 16(b).
one person or prospective class member, but only if the entity is not established for the purpose
of participating in the action." Id. § 77p(f)(2)(C).
148 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c). The statute defines a "covered security" in subsection 16(f)(3) to
include: "[A] security that satisfies the standards for a covered security specified in paragraph (1)
or (2) of section [18(b)] at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation,
omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred." Id. § 77p(f)(3). Excluded from the
definition is: "any debt security that is exempt from registration under this subchapter pursuant to
rules issued by the Commission under section [4(2)]." Id.
149 An individual investor could, for example, bring an action under the Securities Act to
recover for a material misstatement made by an issuer in a prospectus. See Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 6, § I-H-2 (noting that "[c]ivil ... liabilities are imposed for material misstatements
or omissions in the registration statement or prospectus" of a security).
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2).
151 Thus, the statute cannot be read to allow removal of all Securities Act claims.
152 See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
153 See id. (emphasis added).
154 Id. The statute is giving instructions to parties as follows, "Defendant, here is when you
can remove, and district court, here's what to do with removed claims." See id.
155 See id.
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Thus, to be removable, a case must include a claim which meets the
definition of a "covered class action," involves a "covered security," and
furthermore implicates section 16(b). 156  Section 16(b) applies only to
claims "based upon the statutory or common law of any State or
subdivision thereof."' 157  A Securities Act claim, then, could never
implicate section 16(b), because it is based upon federal law. Therefore, a
Securities Act claim, without more, does not trigger the "except as
provided in section [16(c)]" exception in section 22(a), 158 and is not
removable. A Securities Act claim, and a state law claim that is not a
"covered class action"'159 involving a "covered security, as set forth in
subsection (b),"'160 filed together, similarly do not trigger the section 22(a)
exception.
The removable subset of Securities Act claims are those that are filed
together with a state law based "covered class action,"'161 involving a
"covered security as set forth in subsection (b),' ' 62 in state court. Only
then may a Securities Act claim be removed "to the Federal district court
for the district in which the action is pending."'
' 63
III. DID CONGRESS EFFECTUATE ITS INTENTIONS?
A. What Congress Could Have Said
If Congress intended to give defendants the option to remove all class
actions involving Securities Act claims, as the Brody and Alkow decisions
suggest, effectuating this intention could not have been simpler. It could
have done so in SLUSA by merely drafting an additional sentence in
section 16(c).
Section 22(a) need not change at all-the general rule would remain
that "no case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court
of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any Court of the United
States,"' 64 and the general rule would still apply "except as provided in
section [16(c)].' 65
156 See id.
'5 See id. § 77p(b).
158 See id. § 77v(a).
I d. § 77p(c).
160 id.
161 id.
162 Id
163 Id.
'64 Id. § 77v(a) (2000).
165 See id. (emphasis added).
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Section 16(c) could have expressly allowed for removal of a "class
action" arising under the Securities Act, while preserving the preemption
of state law claims for which SLUSA currently provides. Those class
actions arising under the Securities Act that were removed would then be
subject to section 16(b), thus preventing any preempted state law claims
that were asserted along with the Securities Act claim or claims from being
maintained in federal court. The rest of section 16(c), allowing removal of
those covered class actions involving covered securities that implicate
section 16(b), would have been drafted exactly as it was. Finally, the
descriptive language in section 16(c), which indicates that the section
provides only for removal of "covered class actions," would instead have
referred, more generally, to "class actions." As compared with section
16(c) as enacted under SLUSA, the section 16(c) described above would
read:
Removal of eevered class actions. Any class action arising under this
title brought in any State court shall be removable to the Federal district
court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject
to subsection (b). Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action
is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b). 166
B. Exploring the Legislative History of SLUSA
Congress clearly could have drafted SLUSA to allow for removal of
all Securities Act claims, but it did not do so. The simple reason for this
may be that, taken as a whole, the entire legislative body did not intend to
do SO.167 It is possible to infer from the legislative history that some
individual members of both houses thought that the statute should allow
for removal of all Securities Act claims. Furthermore, at least one senator
erroneously read the statute and thought that it did do so. 168 Incidentally,
Judge Harold Leventhal once remarked that supporting a statute's
interpretation by citing its legislative history is analogous to "looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends.' 69 So too here, inferring from these
isolated statements that Congress intended to allow for removal of all class
166 Language which would not have been part of section 16(c) is indicated by strikethrough
text. Language which would have been to be added to section 16(c) is indicated by italicized text.
167 See Grunfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 640.
168 See infra, notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
169 See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 645 (citing Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L.
REv. 195, 214 (1983)).
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actions arising under the Securities Act gives these statements far too
much credence.
On October 7, 1997, thirteen senators co-introduced S. 1260,170 which
was enacted just over a year later on November 3, 1998 as the "Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998." 171 Senator Gramm, a co-
sponsor of the bill, noted in his introductory remarks that the July 24, 1997
hearings before the Securities Subcommittee had made readily apparent to
its members "a migration of [securities class action] lawsuits to State
courts with a real effort and apparently a successful effort [by the
plaintiffs' class action bar] to circumvent what [Congress] had done [in the
PSLRA]." 172 He articulated that the bill, as he understood it, "sets national
standards for stocks that are traded on the national markets .... [J]n the
case of class action suits, and class action suits only, if a stock is traded on
the national market,. . . then the class-action suit has to befiled in Federal
court."1
73
The bill's co-sponsor, Senator Dodd, in his statement introducing
S. 1260, noted that "[i]t is not unreasonable to assume that.., weaker, even
abusive claims.., are now finding a home in State court that they no
longer have in Federal court., 174 He read from a letter from President
Clinton, in which the President expressed concern that the ability of
plaintiffs to select state court to bring securities class action litigation
would lead to "multiple and inconsistent standards [which] could
undermine national law,"'1 75 before echoing Senator Gramm's assertion
that the "migration of frivolous class actions to State court threatens the
effectiveness of the [PSLRA]. ' 176  Senator Dodd called for "national
treatment for national securities trading on national exchanges ' 177 out of
the fear that "the possibility of 50 constantly changing State standards"
would undermine the federal securities laws. 
178
Neither senator overtly supported allowing removal of class actions
involving only Securities Act claims. At most, Senator Gramm's and
Senator Dodd's comments indicated that some of the sponsors of SLUSA
170 See Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 143 CONG. REC. S10475
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
171 SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
172 143 CONG. REC. S10475 (statement of Sen. Gramm).
173 Id. (statement of Sen. Gramm) (emphasis added).
174 Id. at S10476 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (remarking candidly that "any plaintiffs'
attorney worth his salt is going to file in State court if he feels it will give him an advantage").
175 Id. (statement of Sen. Dodd).
176 Id. (statement of Sen. Dodd).
177 Id (statement of Sen. Dodd).
178 Id. (statement of Sen. Dodd).
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were concerned with focusing securities class action litigation involving
nationally traded securities in federal court. 17 9  To the extent that they
exercised the right to do so, allowing a defendant sued in state court on a
Securities Act claim to remove the claim directly addresses this concern.
It would ensure that the "national standards for stocks that are traded on
the national markets,"'180 which the PSLRA set, would be adjudicated in
federal court. Removal would help eliminate the possibility that the
effectiveness of federal securities class action reform would be
undermined by inconsistent state court adjudications of federal claims.
However, neither senator directly addressed these issues.
Similarly, while there are statements elsewhere in SLUSA's
legislative history that tend to support removal, the issue is never
addressed nor supported directly. For example, the House Report from the
Committee of Conference does not explicitly discuss removal of federal
claims. It does, however, note that the "migration of claims from federal
court to state court 'may be the most significant development in securities
litigation' since the passage of the new law in 1995"'18 and indicates that
the bill would make "[f]ederal court the exclusive venue for most
securities class action" litigation involving nationally traded securities.
82
Congressman Bliley voiced his support for the bill on October 15,
1998, remarking that the legislation "will eliminate State court as a venue
for meritless securities litigation. ' 83 His support for the bill stemmed
from his conviction that "lawsuits alleging violations that involve
securities that are offered nationally belong in Federal court."',8 4 It was
this very idea that was, in Congressman Bliley's opinion, the very
"premise" of the legislation. 85  While it can be inferred from these
comments that Congressman Bliley supported removal, he never addressed
the issue directly in his remarks.
However, Senator Feinstein did. On May 13, 1998, she offered her
support for S. 1260,186 praising its establishment of "uniform national
standards in securities fraud class action suits."' 87 She indicated that in her
view, the bill, as drafted, allowed for removal of class action litigation
179 Id. (statement of Sen. Dodd).
180 Id. (statement of Sen. Gramm).
1 144 CONG. REc. 25287, 25886 (daily ed. 1998) (quoting SEC REPORT, supra note 43, at
69).
182 H.R. REP. No. 105-803 at 13 (1998).
181 144 CONG. REC. H11019-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
184 Id (statement of Rep. Bliley) (emphasis added).
185 Id. (statement ofRep. Bliley).
186 144 CONG. REC. S4778 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
187 Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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based on the federal securities laws: "[T]he legislation would provide for
the shifting of securities lawsuits filed in a state court into the more
appropriate federal court, a process called 'removal.' The removal
authority would only apply for class action suits involving nationally-
traded securities, such as the New York Stock Exchange." Removal
authority was of paramount necessity, because without it,
"companies ... whose securities are traded throughout the fifty states[]
could face liability under federal securities laws in fifty state courts.'188
Clearly, Senator Feinstein thought that she was voicing support a bill
which furthered "effective national standards ... to protect [defendants]"
by giving them the option to litigate federal class action securities law
claims involving nationally traded securities in federal court. 89 However,
as established in part III.A. of this Note, her reading of S. 1260, which
ultimately became the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, is erroneous. The statute cannot be read to allow, without more,
removal of a Securities Act claim.' 90 It is beyond reason to infer from
Senator Feinstein's support for an erroneous reading of SLUSA that
Congress as an entire legislative body had the same erroneous reading of
the statute, and therefore failed to effectuate its intentions.
C. Why Congress Stopped Short
Review of the congressional findings in SLUSA itself, about which
the entire legislative body was in accordance, evidences a clear intent to
litigate claims involving nationally traded securities in federal court.' 91
Section 2 of SLUSA noted that the PSLRA "sought to prevent abuses in
private securities fraud lawsuits."' 92 It identifies the problem which has
emerged: "since enactment of [the PSLRA], considerable evidence has
been presented to Congress that a number of securities class action
lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts," a shift which "has
prevented [the PSLRA] from fully achieving its objectives.' 93  SLUSA
modified the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in an attempt to obviate the problem.'
94
188 Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (emphasis added).
189 Id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
190 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
191 See discussion supra Part III.B.
192 SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
193 Id.
194 Id. §§ 101-302.
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SLUSA, however, allowed for removal of Securities Act claims only
in very limited circumstances. 95 Thus, class action litigation of claims
based on federal law can occur in state court at the discretion of the
plaintiff. Furthermore, review of the legislative history indicates that
SLUSA as enacted is consistent with its legislative history. 96 Why, then,
didn't Congress intend for SLUSA to go further towards fulfillment of its
goals?
The answer may be that SLUSA went as far as it could have towards
achieving its objectives. Professors Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C.
Pritchard recently characterized the legislative process as a .'game' in
which a legislature develops a coalition sufficiently large to support
passage of a bill over the threat of any credible veto.' Perhaps those
members of both Houses who supported removal of class actions involving
only Securities Act claims balked at clearly articulating this in the text of
SLUSA out "of a need to compromise in order to accumulate a
majority... in support of legislative action."'198
Legislation introduced in the House around the time of SLUSA would
have gone much further toward centering securities litigation in federal
court. Professor Richard W. Painter reported that a bill was introduced in
the House which would have "preempted state law for almost all suits
involving nationally traded securities-not just class action suits."'199 This
bill, titled the Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997,200 "failed to
make significant headway in the House. 2 °1  While the degree to which
Congress chose to preempt state securities law is beyond the scope of this
Note,202 it is interesting to observe that preemption under SLUSA is
comparatively quite narrow. Proponents of the Securities Litigation
Improvement Act, which would have gone much further, lacked the
support necessary to pass the legislation.
Had SLUSA explicitly allowed removal of all class actions arising
under the Securities Act, it may similarly have lacked the political support
195 See discussion supra Part III.A.
196 See discussion supra Part III.B.
197 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 637.
'9' See id. at 641.
199 Painter, supra note 52, at 48-49.
200 Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997).
201 Painter, supra note 52, at 49.
202 It is worth noting for present purposes, however, that concerns over federalism may not
have been the reason that Congress chose not to preempt all state securities fraud causes of
action. Professor Pritchard reasoned, that "Congress was [aware of] the important role that state
fraud law and state courts play in resolving securities disputes between individuals. Congress
sought to discourage only class actions against the corporate issuer and its affiliates, with their
potential for enormous damages." Pritchard, supra note 59, at 438.
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to pass the 105th Congress. Republicans controlled a majority in both the
houses of Congress at the time SLUSA was introduced.z 3 Professor
Pritchard noted that the Republican majority was generally concerned with
federalism, and with "returning authority to the states. ' 2°  As a general
proposition, proposed legislation which contracted the authority of state
judiciary in favor of augmenting that of the federal judiciary was
unpopular in this political climate.
Predictably, the Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998,205 which
would have allowed the removal of any class action to federal court "by
any defendant or non-representative plaintiff whenever one member of the
plaintiff class was a citizen of a different state than any defendant,,
20 6
stalled in the Republican-controlled legislature. The Class Action
Jurisdiction Act was much broader in scope then SLUSA, in that it applied
to "all civil actions, ' 207 and not merely securities class actions. However,
had SLUSA similarly attempted to expand federal jurisdiction by allowing
for removal of all class actions arising under the Securities Act, it may
have met a similar fate. Thus, those members of Congress whose
statements in SLUSA's legislative history arguably evidence their support
for removal 208 may have balked at effectuating these intentions in the Act
in order to create "a coalition sufficiently large" to support its passage.20 9
CONCLUSION
The federal judiciary has struggled recently with the scope of the
removal provisions of the Securities Act. The only certainty for litigants
has been that the Uniform Standards Act did in fact modify the well-settled
rule that Securities Act claims are not removable from state court.210
Predicting the judicial interpretation of the scope of this modification
continues to be nearly impossible. Admittedly, the provisions are far from
a model of legislative clarity. However, the best reading of SLUSA on its
face suggests that Congress intended to allow removal of Securities Act
claims only when asserted along with preempted state law claims. This
203 The 105th Congress was composed of 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats in the Senate
and 228 Republicans, 206 Democrats and 1 Independent in the House. See S. PUB. 105-20, at 2-
3(1997).
204 Pritchard, supra note 59, at 435.
205 Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998).
206 Pritchard, supra note 59, at 436. The Act would have had the federal judiciary apply
state substantive law, subject to federal procedural rules. Id.
207 H.R. 3789.
208 See discussion supra Part III.B.
209 Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 8, at 637.
210 See supra note 10-12 and accompanying text; see also Pritchard, supra note 59, at 490.
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interpretation of SLUSA gives effect to every word of the statute, and
therefore judicial resort to the statute's legislative history is improper to
resolve the issue.
211
Review of the congressional record suggests that the correct
interpretation of SLUSA, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is also the
correct interpretation as a matter of legislative intent.212 Statements of
some members of Congress arguably indicate their view that SLUSA
should, or did, allow for removal of all Securities Act claims.213 However,
in the aggregate, this evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption that
had Congress intended to change fifty-five years of judicial interpretation
of the Securities Act, it would have done so overtly--or at least discussed
doing so forthrightly. Neither occurred.214  Thus, it is submitted that
district courts faced with this issue should interpret the statute on its face,
as suggested in this Note, without resort to SLUSA's legislative history.
Furthermore, because this interpretation is consistent with congressional
intent, it is unnecessary for Congress to return to this provision at this time
to effectuate its prior intentions.
211 See discussion supra part II.B.2.
212 See supra notes 167-182 and accompanying text.213 See supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
214 See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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